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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. CR 64571

Plaintiff,

JUDGE RONALD SUSTER

-vsSAMUEL SHEPPARD,

MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Defendant.
The State of Ohio,
Jones,

Stephanie Tubbs

Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County,

Prosecuting Attorneys,
Murphy,

by and through counsel,

hereby moves

Marilyn Barkley

Cassidy

this honorable court

pleadings pursuant· to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) .

for

and Assistant
and

Patrick

judgment on

J.
the

The grounds for this

motion are that the State of Ohio is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law as is set forth more fully in the brief attached
hereto and expressly incorporated herein by reference.
Respecffully Submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Prosecuting
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

kley Cassid
Murphy (000 01)
Assist
Prosecuting Attorneys
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

INTRODUCTION

Alan J. Davis, Speciai Administrator of the Estate of Samuel
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that
the late Samuel Sheppard was a wrongfully incarcerated individual
pursuant to R.C. §2305.02 and §2743.48.
that,

pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12

The State of Ohio asserts
(C ) the court should enter

judgment as a matter of law on behalf of the state.

The State of

Ohio is entitled to judgment as a matter of law by operation of the
doctrine of

laches,

and the applicable statutes of

limitation.

Additionally, a claim of wrongful incarceration is a personal claim
which an estate has no standing to pursue.

Finally,

any claim

which may have been lawfully asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated
with his death, the passage of time, and his failure to pursue the
claim at or near the time of his acquittal.

FACTS

Dr.

Samuel Sheppard was

degree on August 17,
wife,

1954,

Marilyn Sheppard.

indicted for

murder in the

first

in connection with the death of his

(Petition Paragraph 1)

His trial ended

with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December
21,

1954,

and

imprisonment.
process,

on

January

3,

1955

he

(Petition, paragraph 2).

the United States Supreme Court
2

was

sentenced

to

life

After a lengthy appeals
in 1964,

reversed the

conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the
trial and the prejudicial role of the media.
3).

(Petition, paragraph

On November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial

and found not guilty of the murder.

(Petition paragraph 4).

Dr.

Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons.
(Petition, paragraph 5) .
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970.

(Petition, paragraph 6).

The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the
Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October,

1995,

nearly thirty years

after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal .

LAW AND ARGUMENT

A.

THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLY TO COURT
PROCEEDINGS EXCEPT WHERE CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE PURSUANT TO
CIVIL RULE 1: ACCORDINGLY THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION

Ohio law is clear that wrongful imprisonment proceedings are
civil in nature.

See Walden v. State,

(1989)

47 Ohio St. 3d 47,

where the court determined that the General Assembly intended to
apply the usual preponderance of the evidence standard to civil
proceedings under R.C. 2305.02.

The court also cites Schrader v.

Equitable

(1985),

Life

Assurance

Soc.

20

Ohio

St.

3d

41

in

differentiating an acquittal in a criminal trial as a determination
that the. state has not met its burden of proof and a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the accused is innocent.

3

Civil

proceedings

Procedure.
RULE 1.

are

subject

to

the

Ohio

Rules

of

Civil

Ohio Civl Rule 1 provides:
Scope of rules:
exceptions.

applicability; construction;

{A}
Applicability.
These rules prescribe the procedure to
be followed in all courts of this state in the exercise of
civil jurisdiction at law or in equity, with the exceptions
stated in subdivision (C) of this rule.
{B} Construction. These rules shall be construed and applied
to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary
expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
ad~inistration of justice.

{C}
Exceptions.
These rules, to the extent that they
would by their nature be clearly inapplicable , shall not
apply to procudure (1) upon appeal to review any
judgment, order or ruling,
(2) in appropriation of
property, ( 3) in forcible entry and detainer, ( 4) in
small claims matters under Chapter 1925, Revised Code,
( 5) in uniform reciprocal support actios, ( 6) in the
commitment of the mentally ill, (7) in all other special
statutory proceedings ; provided, that where any statute
provides for procedure by general or specific reference
to the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such
procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.
Under the foregoing,

the civil rules apply to actions other

than those specified and other

"special statutory proceedings".

Even where special statutory proceedings exist,

the civil rules

apply except to the extent that they are by their nature "clearly
inapplicable."
With reference to wrongful incarceration proceedings pursuant
to R.C. §2305.02 and R.C. §2743.48 the Ohio Supreme Court in Walden
v.

State,

supra,

noted

the

qualitative

differences

criminal prosecutions and civil litigation ... :

4

between

"In the criminal proceeding, the burden of proof is upon the
state ... Moreover, self incrimination, privilege and discovery
rules are different.
In the criminal proceeding, the state
may not depose the defendant nor require the defendant to
testify involuntarily.
In a civil proceeding, not only is the burden of proof usually
different, it is being placed upon the plaintiff
. but
also the rules concerning trial procedure, discovery, evidence
and constitutional safeguards differ in important aspects."
Hence, the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly recognized those aspects
of

wrongful

imprisonment

characteristics.

proceedings

which

bear

civil

action

Logically, such proceedings are subject to the

'

civil rules.

OHIO CIVIL RULE 3 GOVERNS COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION
Ohio

Civil

commenced

by

Rule

3

filing

(A)
a

provides

complaint

that
with

11

a

the

civil

action

court,

is
II

Additionally, Rule 4 provides for issuance of a summons upon the
filing
wrongful

of a complaint.
imprisonment

Alternatively, were the court to view a
proceeding

as

a

declaratory

proceeding

subject to R.C. 2721 et. seq., the Ohio Civil Rules are applicable.
"The procedure for obtaining a declara•tory

See Ohio Rule 57:

shall be in accordance with these rules.

judgment
of

the

wording

of

discovery and trial

Rule

57,

shall be

such

matters

as

11

11

service,

in accordance with these

In light
venue,
rules 11

•

Staff Note, Rule 57.
In the case before this court, no complaint or petition has
been filed with the clerk of courts, civil division.
has issued.

No summons

Clearly, the requisite elements for a civil action
5

which involves motion practice, discovery, and potentially a civil
trial have not been implemented.

Accordingly,

this court lacks

jurisdiction.

B.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE

Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) provides:
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings".
It is well established in Ohio that after reviewing pleadings,
where a court finds that there exist no material issues of fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
moving party's motion for
granted.

judgment on the pleadings

McComb v. Suburban Natural Gas Co.

should be

(1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d

397.
Determination

of

a

motion

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings

is

restricted solely to allegations in the pleadings, and all material
allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom are to be construed in favor of the non-moving
party.

Flanagan v. Williams,

(1993) 87 Ohio App.3d 768.

Moreover,

consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is squarely
within

the

discretion

of

the

court.

"Whether

the

motion

constitutes a delay of trial is within the discretion of the court;
however, if it seems clear that the motion may effectively dispose
of the case, the court should permit it regardless of any delay its
consideration may cause."

Fischer v. Morales, 38 Ohio App. 3d 110

(1987).
6

Judgment

on the pleadings is the appropriate,

outcome for the case at bar.
undisputed.

expeditious

The operative facts as stated are

As will be shown below in greater depth, the State of

Ohio is materially prejudiced by having to defend a claim some
thirty years

after

history relevant

to

it

accrued.
R.C.

Additionally,

the

legislative

§2743.48 together with its

specific

language demonstrate that the intent of the legislature was and
continues

to

be

compensation

of

individuals,

not

their

representatives, heirs and assigns.
Finally, the Sheppard estate advances a so-called "new" theory
of the crime as a

part of

its petition.

Even assuming those

conclusory theories to be true for the purpose of ruling upon this
motion under Civil Rule 12 (C),

those facts have no relevance to

the issue at bar in light of the doctrines of laches and standing
which have been raised by the State of Ohio.

C.

THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES

In order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches,

the

person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his
rights."

Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113,

119 (1959)

The elements of laches are:

asserting a right,

delay or lapse of time in

absence of excuse for such delay,

knowledge,

actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the
other party.

Kennedy v. City of Cleveland,
7

(1984) 16 Ohio App 3d

399,

476 N.E.

2d 683.

Delay in asserting a right does not of

itself constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the
equitable doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for
whose

benefit

the

doctrine

will

operate

has

been

materially

prejudiced by the delay of person asserting his claim.
Corp. v. Sixty Seven Corp,
299.

Thirty Four

(1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d.

Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable

and unexplained length of time under circumstances prejudicial to
the adverse party;

it signifies delay independent of limitations

in statutes, and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.
Cunnin v. Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328.
It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time
has occurred between the
filing of this claim.

acquittal of Samuel

Sheppard and the

In the intervening thirty years since the

acquittal and the near forty two years since the crime occurred,
events

have

transpired which preclude

presenting its complete case;

the

State

of

Ohio

from

not the least of which is the death

of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated.
(Petition,

paragraph

6) .

Claimant's

representatives

conducted

witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably
Moreover,

prior to the enactment of R.C.

fade~.

§2743.48 and R.C.

§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of
moral claims.

Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to

a fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual
8

to fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution.
"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio:
Obligation to Compensate?"

Should There be More than A Moral

12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230. "Inherently

defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial.

. .. the 1923

court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not being
attributable to any fault in the law; actually, the convictions are
due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not legal ones.

These

errors are consequences of variables such as a witness or victim's
reactions to the crime, the level of disturbance in the emotional
balance of an individual in response to both physical and mental
stress."

Emphasis added.

Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until
the true guilty party was ascertained.
in

some

instances,

felt

a

moral

Thereupon, the legislature,

obligation

infliction of injury upon an individual.

to

rectify

state

Certain requirements had

to be met before the legislature so acted:

"First, a cause of action against the state must not
exist for the individual in a court of law
Second
there must be a moral obligation to make amends. A moral
obligation is one which is not enforceable by action,
but is binding on the party who has the obligation in
conscience and according to natural justice.
The
obligation is viewed as a duty which would be enforceable
if not for a rule, such as
sovereign immunity, which
exempts the party from legal liability.
The extent to
which moral obligations are to be recognized has been
deemed to be a determination properly remaining in the
hands of the legislature.
Finally, there must be no
dispute as to the facts of the particular case".

9

"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio:

Should there Be More Than A

Moral Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Capital University Law Review
265 (1982).
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process.
He failed to do so.

Since Sheppard's demise in 1970,

only his

estate, whose standing is questionable and will be further examined
below,

is left to initiate the claim.

The petitioner has set

forth no explanation as to why no recourse has been sought until
now.

While events which have transpired over the passage of time

have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio,

the

face

of the

pleadings reveal that Samuel Sheppard is unavailable to testify at
his own trial.

D.
The

Accordingly, the State's motion should be granted.

THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
bulk of

Chapter 2743,

the Wrongful

Imprisonment
However,

Court of Claims.

statute
R.C.

appears

in

Section 2305.02

provides that the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction
over the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding.

Accordingly,
•

the general statutes of limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305
apply to such actions.

R.C. §2305.07
"Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of
the Revised Code, an action upon a contract not in
writing, express or implied, or upon a liability created
by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be
brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued.
II

10

R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least
one court has noted,

Wright v.

State,

69 Ohio App.

3d 775,

591

N.E.2d 1279 (1990):
"For purposes of statutory construction, 'penal statute' is
one which imposes penalty or creates forfeiture,
while
'remedial statute' is enacted to correct past defects, to
redress existing wrong, or to promote public good . . . In this
regard 2743.48 is a remedial statute in that it addresses an
existing wrong.
The General Assembly determined that it was
patently wrong to deny a person compensation when the judicial
system failed to adequately safeguard his rights, under the
circumstances set forth in the statute ... It does not appear
the legislature intended the remedy to penal ... "
Wright v. State, supra, at 779.

The proceeding at bar is a statutory one.

Petitioner seeks to

recover damages upon a liability created by statute.

Absent the

statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State .of Ohio
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit
upon

an

individual's

incarceration.
forth in R.C.

right

to

seek

As a matter of law,

recovery

for

wrongful

the six year limitation set

The action can be said to have

§2305.07 applies.

accrued , most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective
date of the statute, September 24, 1986.

As the petitioner in this

action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the
action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07.
R.C. §2305.09
"Four Years; certain torts

An action for any of the following causes shall be brought
within four years after the cause thereof accrued;
11

(A) For trespassing upon real property;
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or
detaining it;
(C)
For relief on the ground of fraud;
(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising
on contract nor enumerated in sections §2305.10 to
§2305.12, §2305.14 and §1304.34 of the Revised Code . .
(Emphasis added)
R.C.

§2305.10

applies

to

Bodily

injury or

injury

to

personal

property; §2305.11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution,
false

imprisonment

and

malpractice;

commercial transactions.
herein,

fall

interpretation

under

Thus,

section

of

any

(D)

accrual

of

yields

R.C.

§1304.34

applies

to

rights of the petitioner,
R.C.
the

§2305.09.
date

A liberal

the

wrongful

incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986.

Thus,

assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and
this claim is barred.

E.

THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION

The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its
present

form

in

1968

made

justiciability

a

constit~tional

requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken
by the Ohio Supreme Court.

Fortner v. Thomas

(1970)

22 Ohio St.

2d. 13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.).
It has been long and well established that it is the
duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual
controversies between parties legitimately affected by
specific facts and to render judgments which can be
carried into effect.
It has become settled judicial
responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions
on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by
11

12

judgment of premature declarations or advice upon
potential controversies. " Fortner v. Thomas, supra, at
13.

Even before the enactment of the constitutional

requirement of

justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for
the

consideration of

anything

other

between the actual parties litigant.
Southard, 17 Ohio 402

(1848),

than

actual

controversies

For example,

in Stewart v.

the court held:

"It is our duty to decide such questions only as become
necessary to ascertain the rights of the parties
litigant, and are legitimately presented upon the record,
and we cannot admit that parties have the power to call
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented, which is
of the case.
. 11 Stewart , supra, at 406.

out

The question of standing has been examined most fully in
federal courts.
As the Supreme Court stated in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982):
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional
requirements and prudential considerations
[A]t an
irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes
the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant. '
Gladstone Real tors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 99 (1979) , and that the
injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, 11
Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41
(1976)
In this manner does Article III limit the federal
judicial power 'to those disputes which confine federal courts
to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
97

(1968)

Thus, the standing doctrine can be organized into a three-factor
test:

(1) injury in fact;

(2) causation; and (3) redressability.
13

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 3136 (1992).
In

the

case

at

bar,

factors

(redressability) are not met.

one

(injury

in

fact)

there

recovery

in

discussed

in

is no provision under law for
a

representative
greater

depth

three

The individual who is alleged to

have been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased.
above,

and

capacity.

below,

the

As is discussed

an estate

Moreover,
statute

as

at

to

seek

will

issue,

be

R. C.

§2743.48 applies only to individuals, NOT their representatives,
heirs and assigns.

Additionally,

there is no allegation in the

petition as to any injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to
anyone except the deceased,

Samuel Sheppard.

Finally,

assuming

some injury in fact did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to
the estate cannot redress those injuries.
Estate

of

Samuel

Sheppard

constitutionally requisite

has

failed

It is clear that the
to

set

forth

the

case and controversy to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court.
RC §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS TO
WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS,
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS.
The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented to
be sued in the Court of Claims by virtue of R.C.

§2743.02

which provides, as follows:
"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and
consents to be sued, and have its liability determined,
in the 'court of claims created in this chapter in
accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties, subject to the limitations set
forth in this chapter."

14

(A),

The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability has not
opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense but,
rather permits the
accordance

with

the

liability of the state to be determined in
rules

of

law applicable

to

suits

between

private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being
created by the
permits

waiver of

actions

against

immunity.
the

R.C.

state

to

§2743.02

be

brought

(A)

merely

which

were

previously barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such
actions must be predicated upon previously recognized claims for
relief,

for which the state would have been liable except

sovereign immunity.

Smith v. Wait,

for

(1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at

283.
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment.

That

action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the
General

Assembly.

R. C.

§2743. 48

created

obligations of a substantive nature.

duties,

rights,

and

Smith v. Wait, supra.

The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by
the statutory language.
It
language

is
of

a

cardinal
a

statute

rule

that

itself

the

court must

to determine

first

legislative

look to
intent.

Courts do not have authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous
language of a statute under guise of statutory interpretation , but
must give effect to words used;

in other words,

delete words used or insert words not used.
1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232.

courts may not

In re Collier ( Athens

In interpreting a statute words must be
15

taken

in

their

usual,

Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.

normal

or

customary meaning.

Love

v.

(Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394.

In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a
statute

implies

the

exclusion of others.

(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146,

Kirsheman v.

Paulin

Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473.

See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio ·St. 3d 176
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose
the word "individual".

An individual, as defined by Random House

Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged is:
11

1. a single human being, as distinguished from a group.
2. a person.
3. a distinct, indivisible entity; a single thing,
II
being, instance or item.

The use of the word individual,

as opposed to the word person,

which has undergone extensive legal interpretation,

expresses a

clear , unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual.
Further

evidence

of

the

legislature's

intent

eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48
subsection (B)

to

limit

can be found in

(1)

" When a court of common pleas
determines,
that a
person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, the court shall
provide the person with a copy of this section and' orallv
inform him and his attorney of his rights under this section.
(Emphasis Added)

Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the litigant
himself be present.
logical

that

a

Moreover, as a matter of public policy it is
remedy

be

available

to

those

wrongfully

incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families
16

of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim after the
fact.

Finally,

representatives,
indi victuals

as

had

the

heirs

and

legislature
assigns

compensable under

the

wished

of

to

wrongfully

statute,

included specific language to so indicate.

include

the

imprisoned

they would have

It is not within the

authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to
areas that very language

was designed to exclude.

AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE DEATH
OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD
Section §2311.21 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for abatement by
death of a party.

Specifically, the section states:

"Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding
pending in any court shall abate by the death of either
or both of the parties thereto, except actions for libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or against
a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which
shall abate by the death of either party."
Section §2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes which
survive and

provides:

[i]n addition to the causes of action which survive at
common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or
fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled
or liable thereto."
11

"In order for an action to survive under R.C.

§2305.21,

the

action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means
physical injuries."
46,

47,

(1983).

Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d

At least one court has held
17

11

injuries to the

person does not

encompass injuries to character or reputation:

Flynn v. Relic,

41404 (8th

District. Ohio)

An action for wrongful imprisonment,

thus,

(June 26, 1980)
is not an action for

physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.C. §2305.21.
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided "language
in

R.C. §2311.21, the action is subject to abatement.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, the State of
Ohio respectfully requests that the court enter judgment on its
behalf.
Respectfully Submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY,OHIO

arkley Cassid
Patri
Murphy (0002401)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO
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